This article originally appeared in the Nov/Dec 2009 annual safety issue of Cirrus Pilot magazine.  That issue has been made available to the aviation community.  Rick Beach is the volunteer safety liaison of the Cirrus Owners and Pilots Association.

• Every Cirrus has CAPS
• History of CAPS Activations
• Survivable CAPS Scenarios
• Variety of CAPS Landings
• Planes that Flew Again
• Questions and Myths about CAPS
• CAPS Over Water
• People Under You
• Post-Impact Fires
• You Bought CAPS. When Will You Use It?

Every Cirrus has CAPS

Every Cirrus aircraft built includes the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS). That decision came from co-founder, Alan Klapmeier, who survived a fatal midair collision. There had to be a better way to help a pilot in distress. The airframe parachute serves that purpose.

Many people who fly in a Cirrus aircraft report feeling a great comfort knowing that the parachute can lower them to the ground. Some owners based their purchase decision on the safety features of the Cirrus, including the parachute.

If every Cirrus has one, then every Cirrus pilot needs to learn how and when to use it.

History of CAPS Activations

Including the first activation by Lionel Morrison in October 2002, 35 people have survived very difficult circumstances in 17 activations of CAPS. The table in the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS) web page list all known activations.

Activating CAPS does not guarantee survival nor an injury-free landing. Of the 35 survivors, nine had serious injuries requiring hospital care, one had a minor injury and 25 people had no injuries. One pilot died after a CAPS activation just 528 feet above the ground in a three-turn spin descending at 100 knots, although three other people in the plane survived with serious injuries.

As with any safety system operated outside of its design limits, CAPS activations may not always succeed. One fatal activation occurred at twice the demonstrated deployment speed, perhaps above 270 knots, where the parachute separated from the plane and the pilot perished. Another recent activation occurred in a spin at low altitude, perhaps just 200 feet above ground, and witnesses observed the parachute rocket roar off but the aircraft crashed into trees before the canopy fully opened. A third activation wrapped the extraction cable around the tail when the rocket took an anomalous trajectory, since changed in all Cirrus aircraft through an Airworthiness Directive.

Survivable CAPS Scenarios

CAPS works; it works in a wide variety of situations that otherwise may have resulted in much worse outcomes, if not for the effect of CAPS to slow the aircraft and descend vertically under canopy.

• Control system failures: In one case a mechanic forgot to safety wire the nut on an aileron hinge making control of flight difficult; in another case there was an instrument failure due to water in the pitot-static system.
• Mechanical issues: There were four occurrences. One instance of fuel exhaustion led to an off-airport landing in trees; another reported mechanical problems late at night over marsh land; a catastrophic engine failure that coated the windshield with oil, and finally, a passenger pulled CAPS after fuel was observed streaming from wing.
• High altitude upsets:  There were three separate loss of control accidents at several thousand feet above the ground resulting in very lengthy descents under canopy. See here, here, and here.
• Icing:  Three situations occurred where icing contributed to loss of control or terrain alerts in IMC.  See here, here, and here.
• Pilot incapacitation: One pilot lost consciousness and awoke in a high-speed dive then recovered, but felt numbness in his leg and decided to deploy CAPS rather than risk loss of control on approach and landing.
• Spatial disorientation: Several pilots lost control of their aircraft and activated CAPS to assure a less risky landing; one in a classic VFR-into-IMC situation, another when the door popped open and rain came into the cabin, and the other in severe turbulence on final approach.

These survivable accidents demonstrate the viability of CAPS in risky situations. Although some seek to argue that CAPS may not have been necessary, no one can argue that 35 people survived these situations.

Variety of CAPS Landings

In all of the CAPS activations, only the first accident pilot chose when and where to land. Lionel Morrison encountered his maintenance problem with the aileron hinge at low altitude on departure, so he climbed and maneuvered to a brushy area near a golf course where he pulled the red handle. The funny story told here involves golfers coming over to investigate and upon learning that he was fine simply played on!

Otherwise, all other CAPS activations were pull first and then wonder where they will land later. Bill Graham tells the story of his wife Barbara looking out the window as they were descending and recommending landing sites. Of course, he knew that under that 55-foot canopy he had no control, so he simply let her believe that she was helping.

The list of survivable CAPS landings includes the following terrain:

• Fields, both frozen and soft
• Shrubs, low trees
• Trees, orchards, forests
• Mountain slope
• Power lines, communications tower*
• Residential neighborhood street
• Water, river bay,* shallow pond,* bayou canal

The asterisks (*) mark landings with serious injuries or in the incident of the shallow pond, death.

Planes that Flew Again

Many people express surprise that after a CAPS deployment, the airplane can be repaired and flown again. Conventional wisdom states that when you pull the red handle, the airplane belongs to the insurance company. Still, these airplanes flew again:

• N1223S: Cirrus took possession of the first CAPS deployment aircraft, rebuilt it and sold it. Unfortunately, it was later involved in a fatal accident.
• CGEMC: The aircraft was extracted by helicopter from the mountain slope on Mount O'Leary and repaired to fly again in Canada.
• N931CD: Bill Graham sold his repaired SR22 to a friend, a retired airline pilot, and reports that last year his old and new planes reunited at his hangar.
• N3425L: This airplane is listed as exported to Brazil.
• N181LM: After the CAPS pull and landing in shrubs, this aircraft was so lightly damaged that it qualified for a ferry permit from Jamaica to the United States for repairs.

Questions and Myths about CAPS

Given the wealth of information gained from studying these CAPS deployments, we can respond to questions and myths about using CAPS.

- How Fast? -

Cirrus publishes Vpd, the demonstrated deployment speed, for activating CAPS as 133 KIAS for the SR22. Obviously, you should expect deployment at lower speeds would work just as well.

What about faster speeds? Recall that this is a demonstrated speed, not a limiting speed. Here's the data known so far:

• 133 KIAS: Vpd, demonstrated for certification in level flight.
• 170 KIAS (approx.): Last recorded radar return was 190 knots ground speed, converted to indicated airspeed, at Haverstraw, N.Y.
• 187 knots: Drop test by BRS Parachutes of the parachute and rigging, but not the risers attached to Cirrus airframe.
• 270 knots: Radar return about the time of parachute deployment in Norden, Calif., fatal accident, in which the parachute separated from the airframe.

- How Low? -

Several CAPS activations occurred many thousands of feet above ground. Bill and Barbara Graham spent over five minutes under canopy to descend at least 10,000 feet.

But what do we know about low-level activations? How low can you activate the parachute and survive? The answer depends on how the airplane is flying, in a spin at 100 knots, climbing, or an engine-out descent?

• 200 feet: Estimated height above ground by witnesses to the fatal accident in Deltona, Fla. The plane was in a spin, perhaps descending at 100 knots, and the parachute failed to open before impact with trees; two fatalities.
• 400 feet: Demonstrated loss of altitude from deployment in level flight.
• 400 feet: Approximate height of successful deployment in engine-out descent prior to forced landing in trees; pilot broke an ankle, three passengers uninjured.
• 528 feet: Recorded data from Indianapolis, Ind., fatal accident indicates this altitude, just four seconds prior to impact in a retention pond while aircraft was in a three-turn spin; aircraft decelerated from 100 knots to 67 knots then impacted with parachute observed only partially inflated; pilot died, three passengers suffered back injuries.
• 700 feet: Deployed during departure climb when instruments went haywire due to water in pitot-static system; aircraft was photographed emerging from clouds under canopy.
• 800 feet: Approximate height of successful deployment in descent after loss of control when pilot attempted to close door that popped open letting rain into cabin.
• 920 feet: Demonstrated loss of altitude from initiation of one-and-a-half-turn spin to level under canopy.
• 1,600 feet: Approximate height of successful deployment in high-speed dive at Haverstraw, N.Y.
• 1,800 feet: Approximate height of successful deployment during pilot disorientation during VFR-into-IMC near Nantucket, Mass.
• 2,000 feet: Approximate height of successful deployment when terrain alert prompted pilot to recover and pull CAPS at Luna, N.M. (see page 34).

CAPS Over Water

An unresolved controversy exists surrounding the use of CAPS over water. One death and four serious injuries occurred in two CAPS activations over water. Yet, in one incident, a pilot who landed in a bayou canal was uninjured, and the airplane so lightly damaged that it has not yet shown up as an accident in the NTSB database!

As many people observe, the CAPS design intent was for the main landing gear to absorb energy by flexing when landing on a hard surface. Of course, that does not happen when landing in water. Still, the SR2X design incorporates many other features that help make water landings survivable.

Ilan Reich reports that his landing into Haverstraw Bay on the Hudson River resulted in the airplane belly flopping onto the water, waves rising to the top of the window, rebounding to float on the surface and then water slowly seeping into the cabin. His plane floated for about four minutes. He suffered compression fractures of the lower back vertebrae. Still, he was sufficiently mobile to use the egress hammer to break the window, climb out onto the wing, then return to retrieve his life vest from the back seat, and swim half-way to shore before being picked up by first responders in a boat.

Based on the accident reports of CAPS activations, we know the following:

• Cirrus aircraft will float, at least for a while.
• A vertical descent under parachute into water will make a big splash and likely submerge the plane briefly before it floats on the surface.
• CAPS deployments occasionally will rip off a door when the riser comes taut, moving from the rear parachute cavity to the firewall attachment point.
• Time under canopy will be about 35 seconds for every 1,000 feet of descent, so you will likely have time to prepare for egress and report your position.
• Back injuries occurred in two of the three water landings.
• Energy-absorbing design in the seat reduced the three inches of honeycomb aluminum to about 0.75 inches.

Off-Airport Landings

Every pilot certified in the United States must demonstrate a simulated emergency forced landing. To my knowledge, demonstrating the simulated use of CAPS would not suffice! Yet, Cirrus pilots can choose to use CAPS rather than risk impacts during off-airport landings: telephone and power wires, fence posts, ditches, rocks, stumps, berms, signs - all of which have damaged Cirrus aircraft with resulting injuries to some occupants.

With CAPS, the laws of physics are your friends. Impact energy goes up with the square of velocity. Descent under canopy is 1,700 fpm, or about 20 knots. Touchdown speed for a full-stall landing is about 60 knots. That is three times greater velocity and hence, nine times greater energy. Impact from a fully developed spin would be about 100 knots. That's five times greater velocity and 25 times greater impact energy. Impact from a spiral dive at 180 knots would be nine times greater velocity and hence, 81 times greater impact energy. The human body will not likely survive impacts of that magnitude.

Only if your wheels turn, and you do not hit anything on your rollout, will an off-airport landing equate to a runway landing. Unfortunately, the first obstacle may cause loss of directional control and then you are along for the ride at higher energy than if you were under CAPS.

People Under You

Some critics of CAPS point out that you have no control of where you land, so they conjure up the worst-case scenario, which would be descending upon a schoolyard of children.

Accident investigators routinely interview witnesses of CAPS landings who report hearing the aircraft and watching it descend under canopy. Not the same surprise as a high-speed descent into a house. We have at least two CAPS deployments where people on the ground had the time to photograph the airplane under canopy.

At first, I thought this meant that these witnesses heard the rocket, which is known to be loud. It turns out that the sound of the 55-foot round parachute snapping open makes a much sharper and more distinct sound. Furthermore, the descent rate at 17 knots gives people on the ground time to react to the sound they hear.

The Gaithersburg, Md. activation landed on a residential street. The plane looked the worse for wear after bouncing off tree branches and cracking a wing tip on the ground. Not the same as a high-speed impact from loss of control.

Post-Impact Fires

A final observation about CAPS activations is post-impact fires. None of the 20 CAPS activations resulted in a post-impact fire, whereas 24 of 55 fatal accidents involved post-impact fires.

You Bought CAPS. When Will You Use It?

CAPS works. Your Cirrus has one. Now, you need to decide when you will use it.

Find a simulator with a CAPS activation handle. Practice emergency scenarios that include situations where the best outcome would be a CAPS pull. All of the simulator instructors know how to induce these reactions.

Enroll your partner in the Partner-in-Command course, often associated with Cirrus Pilot Proficiency Programs (CPPP) and other COPA events. Each participant will pull the handle and experience the force involved to activate the parachute.

Finally, think through the reasons why you would consider CAPS an acceptable action as a last resort.

Remember, you will have to abandon your practiced recovery techniques to shift to pulling the red handle. By my reckoning, over half of the Cirrus fatal accident pilots had the opportunity, but did not pull. Some aircraft still had the safety pin in with the "Remove Before Flight" flag.

"Pull early, pull often!"

When giving talks or posting on the web about the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS), members of the audience commonly report misconceptions and misinformation about the parachute. Sometimes these are their own beliefs, but more often they report something from an instructor or fellow pilot. Sometimes they just don’t know the latest information, other times they believe inaccurate claims by detractors and/or competitors, and at times they staunchly defend their alternative beliefs.

This article seeks to lay out the facts about all of the known CAPS activations. After careful examination of the data, we address some of the myths and misconceptions.

This article was originally published in the November/December 2009 annual safety issue of the Cirrus Pilot magazine for members of COPA.  As a service to all Cirrus pilots and the aviation community, COPA made this issue available to the public.  We encourage anyone interested in aviation safety, and especially Cirrus pilots, to consider joining COPA.  Please visit the COPA home page and click on the link to Join COPA.  For more information about this article or the safety analysis, contact Rick Beach by email.