Pull early, pull often!

Early Reflections on CAPS Pull #32 by Dick McGlaughlin in the Bahamas

Rick Beach — Tue, 10 Jan 2012 06:34:00 GMT

Dr. Richard “Dick” McGlaughlin and his daughter Elaine made national news after they used the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS) to splash down in the azure blue waters near the Bahamas. Their landing under that big red-and-white parachute counted as the 28th CAPS save of 53 survivors since 1999 when Cirrus Aircraft introduced this rocket-fired parachute on the SR20 and SR22 models.

(Photo: US Coast Guard. Cirrus SR22 N732EA in the water off Andros Island, Bahamas, with two people in a life raft holding onto the risers from the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System)

Dick frequently posts on the web forum of the Cirrus Owners and Pilots Association (COPA), where he is a respected and popular contributor, and he has already posted some details of the experience.

Does your engine sound different flying over water?

Many of us worry that our engines sound differently as soon as we embark on a long trip over water. Most often it’s our imagination.

This time, the engine in Dick’s plane stopped!

First the oil pressure dropped slightly and within three or four minutes went to zero. Then the engine seized and the propeller stopped. Elaine called it insane, as they were flying along at 9,500 feet but now the prop was straight up and down!

Haiti Beckons

Dick and Elaine were on their way to Haiti where Dick, a medical doctor, has regularly flown himself and supplies and volunteers to offer medical services after the earthquake and cholera epidemic. In fact, Dick has recruited several other COPA members who purchased hard-to-find supplies and flew them to Haiti in their personal Cirrus aircraft. A Cirrus can fly this route direct non-stop, when there is fuel available in Haiti. The route takes you close to Andros Island, the big island in the Bahamas.

(Dr. Dick McGlaughlin with a recovering patient, Crystal, in Haiti soon after the earthquake in June 2010.)

The Engine Stops Over Water

Cruising at 9,500 feet when the engine stops, the Cirrus will glide about 15 miles in about 10 minutes. The advice to trim all the way back gave Dick a quick and effective way to establish best glide airspeed.

He declared an emergency with Miami air traffic controllers and headed for nearest land. A big plus was the warm Atlantic Ocean. On board, they had a life vests, life raft, a personal locator beacon for search and rescue, and a hammer to break the windows if the doors would not open.

Dick and Elaine got within 2 miles of Andros Island, but not close enough to land there.

Emergency Landing on Water: To Ditch or Pull CAPS Handle?

A Cirrus pilot can choose to enter the water either by flying to the surface and ditching as slow as practical, or by deploying the airframe parachute and descending under canopy to a splash down.

People survive conventional ditching over 90% of the time, although some people survive the landing only to die from exposure or drowning afterwards. Good survival and rescue equipment helps the prepared. COPA recommends following the advice of our aviation survival partner, the Equipped to Survive Foundation.

Five Cirrus pilots have deployed the CAPS parachute over water. The results were generally favorable, with some concerns about back injuries, and how quickly people can get out of the plane. One pilot died when his son pulled the handle so close to the ground in a spin that the parachute did not have much time to slow the plane. So, COPA encourages pilots to pull early and prepare for egress, the things you need to do as you exit the plane in the water.

Dick admits to being unsure of what would happen with a CAPS splash down, but he determined that he would pull at 2,000 feet above the ocean. Actually, he got impatient and pulled at 2,300 feet!

The Rocket Goes Off!

The parachute in the Cirrus remains hidden inside the rear of the plane until the pilot, or any other person in the plane, pulls a red handle in the cockpit roof. That cable needs a good yank, first out of the holder and then down to activate the rocket igniter.

That rocket travels fast!

Within a couple of seconds the rocket blasts through a protective cover, pulls the heavy parachute bag out of the plane, rips the risers out of hidden channels to hold the plane at three points, two in front and one in the rear, then stretches the 90-foot risers to full length. No more than two seconds and the plane begins to slow down immediately. Typical deployments show that after about 8 seconds, the parachute slowed all forward momentum and the plane descends level under canopy at about 20 mph or 1700 feet per minute.

(Deployment sequence for the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System. Source: Cirrus Aircraft SR22 Pilot Operating Handbook)

The parachute slows you down from 100 mph to zero in eight seconds. As Dick recalls, he cautioned Elaine to tighten her seatbelt low across her hips. Yet the jerk in those first few seconds caused her to bend forward and bump her head on the dashboard.

Simulating The Cirrus Parachute

Several aircraft simulators exist where Cirrus pilots can experience what happens when the CAPS parachute deploys. Dick visited the simulator in Atlanta that moves the platform and pilot seats to create the illusion of flying. That’s where he pulled the simulated CAPS handle. The simulator creates the jerk and points the nose down until the parachute slows the plane when it levels the plane as if under canopy. That prepared him for the dramatic view from the front window as the nose drops and you are looking at the expanse of blue water!

(A right-seat passenger activates the red CAPS handle in the roof of the cockpit in the Simtrain full-motion simulator located at The Flight Academy at North Las Vegas Airport)

Cirrus pilots can locate simulators, especially ones with CAPS handles, across the US and the newest full-motion sim in Poland.

Water Splash Down

Cirrus designed the CAPS system with energy absorbing features to protect people when coming straight down. The engineers equate the impact to a drop of about 13 feet.

The main landing gear legs bend to absorb energy. The seat bottoms contain a light honeycomb structure that crushes to absorb energy. The four-point seat belts keep your back straight against the seat. The pilot and co-pilot control sticks, the yokes, mount off to the side to avoid impaling injuries. The instrument panel is padded to absorb energy.

Note: while many Cirrus airplanes include airbags, they are designed for frontal impacts and do not operate in vertical impacts typical of a CAPS parachute landing.

Dick vividly describes their splash down as a hard landing, harder than he expected. But both he and Elaine were uninjured. The cabin quickly began to fill with water through the fresh air vents, so they felt urgency to get out of the plane. While Elaine’s door would not open, the pilot door opened easily and both got onto the wing with their life vests and life raft.

The raft promptly overturned when inflated and Dick struggled to get it right way up. From the pictures, this single-tube four-person life raft looks very tiny and quite modest. Think carefully about your choice of life raft as your survival waiting for rescue may depend upon keeping warm and out of the sun or stormy weather.

(Dick and Elaine McGlauglin in their modest four-person life raft holding onto the risers of the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System trying to stay with the plane and not drift away. Source: US Coast Guard)

Coast Guard Rescue

Any search and rescue effort requires coordination among many agencies. However, the sound and sight of a helicopter dropping a rescue swimmer makes the news. The rescuers reported seeing the parachute about eight miles away. The life raft was just a dot on the ocean.

(Rescue swimmer from the US Coast Guard prepares Elaine and Dick McGlauglin for hoisting into the helicopter. Source: US Coast Guard)

Unfortunately, when the helicopter approached the plane, the downwash reinflated the parachute and lifted it about 30 feet in the air. Dick and Elaine had been holding onto the risers to avoid drifting away from their most visible rescue streamer, the 50-foot diameter red-and-white parachute. Stay with the plane until rescued!

The plane sank in about 10 feet of water, although the parachute seemed to keep it upright.

The helicopter took the McGlauglins to Nassau for an unplanned hotel stay. They soon arranged to continue their travel to Haiti.

Lessons for Cirrus Pilots

The Cirrus Airframe Parachute System worked again over water with two survivors without injuries. Anticipate the need to use CAPS for an emergency by practicing in a simulator with a CAPS handle. Consider carefully your survival and rescue equipment for the conditions that you fly over, not just at your departure and destination. Pull early over water to give yourself time to prepare for splash down and egress from the airplane.

And always fly with a personal locator beacon attached to you by a cord or lanyard. If it isn’t with you, then it can’t save you!

Observing a dramatic reduction in Cirrus fatal accidents

Rick Beach — Wed, 11 May 2011 15:22:00 GMT

I posted an observation about a dramatic reduction in fatal accidents a week ago while updating the Cirrus accident statistics for the upcoming Cirrus Pilot Proficiency Program (CPPP) events,

Here's a chart of the number of fatal Cirrus accidents and CAPS saves by quarter since the introduction of the SR20 in mid-1999. Fatal accidents in red, with darker bars for winter months and lighter bars for summer months, and green bars for CAPS parachute saves.

What I noted was that in the most recent 9 months, there had been only 1 fatal accident per quarter. Prior to that, in the past 36 months there were 39 fatal accidents. So at the end of 2010Q3, the frequency of fatal accidents dropped from 1 a month to 1 every three months. Abruptly.

Were we flying so much less? Hard to substantiate a 33% reduction in flying hours, since Cirrus Aircraft reports increased activity through their warranty and SB updates of Hobbs meter data.

When I calculate the rate of fatal Cirrus accidents per 100,000 flight hours using the Cirrus data, the rate was 1.60 at the end of 2010Q3 and dropped to 1.05 at the end of 2011Q1. Wow. Recall that the non-commercial fixed wing rate in 2009 went up to 1.30 (source: 2010 Nall Report)

What else happened in August/September 2010?

My hypothesis: the August 2010 distribution of the Safety Alert on landings by Cirrus Aircraft and COPA to all owner/operators of Cirrus aircraft.

That letter was unique in that it recommended three actions:
1. Pay attention to the proper procedures for landings and slow flight
2. Conduct a recurrency flight with a training partner
3. Use the brief landing standardization syllabus

The letter was supported by discussions on the COPA forum, by requirements imposed by some insurance carriers, but most importantly, by the Cirrus Training Network.

In my view, the combination of a relevant and timely issue, a set of recommended procedures, a training syllabus, and a training network contributed to a dramatic drop in the number of fatal accidents.

As further evidence for my hypothesis that these communications about training and reflecting on our proficiency are effective, I note an earlier safety letter about icing from Alan Klapmeier and Mike Radomsky issued in October 2006. Since then, there has not been a fatal Cirrus accident where the NTSB probable cause reports list icing as a cause, and three CAPS saves involving icing. No fatal icing accidents in 4-1/2 years! (Although perhaps two fatal accidents since then involve winter weather where icing may have been a factor.)

My personal belief is that the emphasis on training resources and communication with owner/operators has demonstrated an effect on reducing the number of fatal accidents.

Cheers
Rick

Ban low-speed flying "phobia" -- insights from John King for Cirrus pilots

Rick Beach — Mon, 09 May 2011 22:32:00 GMT

As I posted in a separate thread about the SAFE symposium (see COPA participation in SAFE GA pilot training reform symposium), John King presented some counter-intuitive solutions to create a sea-change in the culture of aviation.

One applies to Cirrus pilots: Ban low-speed flying "phobia"

As COPA members have discussed for years, Cirrus instructors have often taught Cirrus pilots to land too fast. The fear of tail strikes seems to have put the fear of landing too slow in way too many pilots.

So, our community has this "phobia" that John talks about. Furthermore, this is timely because of the discussion of the Cory Lidle accident that involved a high-speed narrow-canyon turn.

Here are John King's slides (posted with permission):

Ban low airspeed phobia

One-third of all fatalities come from stalls/spins while maneuvering
So therefore we should tell pilots to slow down when maneuvering

Most people think

Stall/spin accidents come from flying too slow

Let's consider

That they may be caused by flying too fast

An imminent stall caused by flying too slow

Is easy to recognize
The controls get mushy
The air noise decreases
The airplane buffets well in advance

A stall caused by an
increase in load factor

Gives much less warning
The controls aren't mushy
The air noise is still at the usual level
The buffet gives little if any warning

Flight instructors are afraid
their students will stall

Therefore they have them fly too fast

The result is

Huge patterns
Steeper banks
More load factor

Radius of turn versus airspeed

Bank Angle vs Airspeed

What surprised me was the consequences of flying too fast in the traffic pattern. Sure, we have debated the landing speeds being too high. But wow, the impact on load factor and stall speed in a high-speed base-to-final turn may well be a crucial insight into several Cirrus fatal accidents: Phoenix, AZ; Waxhaw, NC; New Windsor, NY; Lindsay, OK; Statesville, NC; Edgewater, MD; Zurich, Switzerland; Tuscaloosa, AL; and of course, Manhattan, NY, the Cory Lidle accident. Could flying too fast while maneuvering be a common factor here?

Cirrus pilots, take note! Go up with an experienced Cirrus instructor and explore the differences between stalls in turns at different airspeeds. I'm going to chat with the CPPP instructors about this and probably encourage them to add it to the CPPP recurrent training experience.

Ban low-speed flying "phobia"

What a simple, yet possibly very important piece of advice for Cirrus pilots.

Cheers
Rick

Reflections on Cirrus fatal #65 at Chapel Hill, NC on 12 July 2010

Rick Beach — Sun, 01 May 2011 19:16:00 GMT

This blog is the second attempt to share lessons and insights gained from studying a Cirrus fatal accident, Cirrus fatal #65 in SR20 N527MJ near Chapel Hill (was Sr 20 Down Chapel Hill).

(My first blog explored the loss of engine power at Buttonville Airport. See Reflections on Cirrus fatal #61 near Buttonville Airport in Canada)

My intent is not to second-guess the accident investigators, so I don't attempt to figure out what happened. I wasn't there. I don't have enough information.

I point you to the NTSB determination of probable cause:

Witnesses observed the airplane overfly the runway and enter a left traffic pattern. The airplane appeared to be faster than they were accustomed to seeing small airplanes operating. The airplane touched down hard on the runway surface and bounced several times before departing off the left side into the grass. The engine was described by the witnesses as operating at full power and the airplane appeared to by flying about 60 to 70 mph. The nose of the airplane was observed in a 45-degree nose up attitude and then leveled out back onto the ground. The airplane traveled 840 feet until the left wing collided with a tree and the airplane spun to the left and collided with the airport perimeter fence. The left and right flaps were in the retracted position. The Pilot's Operating Handbook for the airplane stated that the flaps are required to be extended 50 percent for a balked landing/go-around. No anomalies were noted during the examination of the airframe, flight controls, engine assembly, and accessories.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this ACC as follows:

The pilot's improper recovery from a bounced landing and subsequent improper go-around procedure, which resulted in a loss of directional control, runway excursion, and collision with a tree.

More information is available from the NTSB docket of public information, from which much of the detail here was gleaned. The docket contains several photographs, reports, witness statements, transcripts, selected for public disclosure.

What I do is ask what would I do if I faced similar situations that are described in the accident reports? How would I handle those challenges?

Planning to Land at an Unfamiliar Airport

One aspect of this flight was that the pilot had never flown to Chapel Hill, NC, before. The Horace Williams Airport (KIGX) is a typical small general aviation airport with a single 4005' runway oriented east/west 09/27.

Looking at the satellite view, I notice that the runway is surrounded by trees closer than usual for half of the runway

From my experience, that likely affects the winds, causing crosswinds to shift direction aligned with the runway somewhere during my final approach. I also notice that the ramp is at the 27 end of the runway and there is no parallel taxiway, which probably induces arrivals to favor runway 09.

Choosing the Runway at an Unfamiliar Airport

When approaching an unfamiliar airport, how do you choose which runway to land?

When the winds are closely aligned with the runway, the answer is easy. When the airport has a control tower, you will be told the active runway. When the airport has a UNICOM frequency, there is likely to be someone who can advise you with the active runway. When the airport has a CTAF frequency and there are planes in the pattern, then you can listen and figure out the active runway.

In the factual report of this Chapel Hill accident, the reported winds were 170 degrees at 4 knots, almost a direct crosswind. Apparently, there was little traffic.

Otherwise, no traffic and no advice, the choice is up to us. How would I choose? I would suspect the winds would shift, so if I choose, I could be wrong. But 4000' runways with a 4 knot tailwind is manageable, so even if I was wrong, I would prefer not to back taxi on runway 27, so I would probably choose runway 09, anticipate a tailwind, and manage my landings speeds with an expectation to go-around if things don't go well.

In this case, witnesses describe the plane flying downwind, making a “U” turn to final, landing on runway 09 with a tailwind according to the windsock next to the runway.

Landing Speeds

Cirrus pilots have demonstrated a lot of problems with landing too fast. COPA has tracked some of this to misinformation from instructors fearful of tail strikes, some comes from the difference in sight picture, some comes from fear of slow flight. Whatever. Excessive speed during landings is killing us and damaging airplanes.

For a discussion of landing speeds, see this blog: A Photo Story of Landing a Cirrus

As a refresher, the speeds published in the Flight Operations Manual are 100 KIAS downwind, 90 KIAS base, 80 KIAS short final, 73-77 KIAS over the threshold (not the numbers), near stall at touchdown.

One tactic I use is to check my ground speed during final approach. Are the winds behaving as I expect them? Has the wind shifted? Normally, my ground speed would be lower than my airspeed as I land into the wind with a shorter rollout and less braking. If the ground speed is about the same, then the winds are calm and I should be able to land with book numbers. If the ground speed is higher, then I have a tailwind and can expect a longer float and rollout with perhaps greater braking with an increased possibility of needing to go around.

Landing Too Fast and Bouncing on the Runway

Witnesses to this accident report that the aircraft came in faster than usual and bounced.

Kyle Henn, the rear seat passenger, reported “The airplane touched down on the runway a made a " hop" back into the air, touched back down on the runway, made another "hop" went back into the air, touched back on the runway and made another "hop" before coming back down on the runway at about midfield.”

Chad Lewis, an Army Captain waiting for Kyle Henn and first on the scene, reported “On it's final approach, the plane was initially not in line with the runway, but after two minor corrections, one to the left, then one back to the right, it was lined up. It seemed to be coming in faster than usual for a small plane and according to the windsock beside the runway, the plane was landing with the wind, not against it.

Landing with a tailwind at an unfamiliar airport is challenging. Landing too fast adds energy to the situation. Don't know how this Cirrus pilot practiced landings nor what his typical landing speeds were, but we know that the plane did not execute a smooth landing.

The Go Around Decision

Bounce once, go around!

Bounce more than once, stay on the ground!

Landing hard happens occasionally. Sometimes from excess speed, sometimes from wind shear, sometimes from my ham-handed controls. If the plane bounces back up in the air, often I'm no longer flying straight but turned slightly. And if I am landing fast and touching down above stall speed, then the wings are still generating lift. Both of those situations prompt the advice to Go Around!

However, if you bounce more than once, you probably have had a prop strike and maybe you won't have the full power you need. The fatal accident in Caldwell, NJ, involved four bounces leaving a portion of a propeller blade on the runway resulting in an unsuccessful climb and ultimate crash. Hard decision, since prop strikes are apparently often not noticed in the cockpit.

In this accident, the plane bounced more than once including touching down on the nose wheel. Chad Lewis reported “The initial landing was pretty hard and there was a small bounce where all three wheels left the ground. When the plane came down the second time, the front wheel hit first and there was a bigger bounce. The plane bounced a third and fourth time, each time the front wheel hitting first and each bounce getting more pronounced.”

That describes pilot-induced oscillations. The pilot attempts to keep the plane on the ground for landing and causes bigger and bigger bounces. In a Cirrus, bounce once, go around!

The Go Around Procedure

Once you decide to go around, the POH procedure is clear:

1. Autopilot .....................................................................DISENGAGE
2. Power Lever ........................................................FULL FORWARD
3. Flaps ........................................................................................50%
4. Airspeed....................................................................... 75-80 KIAS
After clear of obstacles:
5. Flaps .........................................................................................UP

You need power … Now! But note the flaps change. Landing procedure is to use full flaps before short final approach. Now, in the go around, you select 50% flaps. Only after clear of obstacles should you raise the flaps.

By the way, given the COPA encouragement of CAPS during departure climb emergencies, I now consider 500' as my CAPS-viable altitude for clear of obstacles! That's when I raise flaps.

In an SR20, raising flaps too much or too early badly affects the climb performance. We have had two SR20 accidents implicating flaps. A fatal accident at Greenwood, SC, where the pilot took off over gross with no flaps, and failed to outclimb trees, stalled and crashed. Another non-fatal accident at Fish Haven, ID, where the pilot executed a go around but inadvertently selected 0% flaps causing the plane to sink and crash off the end of the runway.

In this crash at Chapel Hill, the investigators found the flaps in the wreckage fully retracted, in the UP position.

Tough combination: landing with excessive speed, bouncing several times, retracting flaps too early.

Furthermore, one witness located at a maintenance hangar reported “He heard a noise similar to a tail scrape, and heard an engine at full power. He looked towards runway 9 and observed Cirrus in a 45-degree nose up attitude in the vicinity of the last one third of the runway. He then observed the nose to level out back on the ground and the airplane was veering left off the left side of the runway in the grass.”

Such an extreme attitude is very unusual. Could be an exaggeration by the witness, could be a stress reaction by the pilot who wants the plane to climb by pulling back on the yoke, could be an aerodynamic reaction to a departure stall.

Lazy Right Foot Syndrome

Ever notice that Cirrus runway excursions all seem to be on the left side of the runway? This one did. Here is the NTSB diagram of the ground scars found and the path of the aircraft.

Why left? I don't know for sure, but my suspicion is that Cirrus pilots fail to apply sufficient right rudder to compensate for the left-turning tendency when applying full power, especially during a go around procedure. More right rudder is needed to keep the plane going straight!

Pilots Who Fly With Other Pilots

One interesting aspect of this accident was the presence of an experienced pilot in the right seat accompanying the Cirrus pilot. That pilot had zero time in a Cirrus but 12,500 hours in other planes.

When you fly with another pilot, how do you establish who does what and when? Recall deciding on the positive exchange of controls with an instructor? Do you do that with other pilots? Probably not. The instructor is ensuring that they can save themselves by taking control. In less formal settings, do we do the same thing?

For accident investigators, having two pilots in the front seats in an aircraft with dual controls, it can be impossible to determine who was flying. Have you been induced by other pilots to let them handle the controls? Even a landing?

Then when something bad happens during the flight, how does the pilot not flying deal with the temptation to intervene? How does the pilot in command deal with a surprise like that? Even with prior discussion and agreement, the adrenaline rush of an emergency combined with greater experience might override the commitment to let the pilot in command handle everything.

I encourage anyone in the plane to speak up if they sense a problem, but especially a pilot flying with me. However, I do establish my prominence as pilot in command, it's my airplane, so speak up but don't touch anything without my direction.

Acknowledgements

This accident at Chapel Hill is special because the widow of the pilot joined the COPA community and shared her life experiences after the accident. Deb Markwood posts regularly in the blog Looking Back, Looking Forward - A Widow's Perspective. She and I have communicated regularly about the accident investigation as she wants to understand more about what happened to her husband Tom. COPA has invited Deb to the Allentown CPPP in June.

My appreciation for and understanding of accident investigations comes from long conversations with two key people at Cirrus Aircraft, Brad Miller and Brannon Mayer. Their professional dedication to helping us understand what happened has helped me explain things clearly. Their discretion is appreciated and honored.

Finally, a lot of my understanding of better ways to fly my Cirrus come from interacting with the amazing CPPP instructors who routinely vie to teach at the Cirrus Pilot Proficiency Program. Their commitment to our safety is appreciated.

Reflections on Cirrus fatal #61 near Buttonville Airport in Canada

Rick Beach — Sat, 05 Mar 2011 18:50:00 GMT

SR20 C-GYPJ crashed into a building and two people died last 25 May, 2010. The accident was extensively discussed on the COPA forums in two threads:

The SR20 departed Buttonville Aiport after avionics maintenance with two pilots aboard and encountered a loss of engine power due to a fracture of a cylinder. The pilot attempted to turn back to the airport, lost control, attempted recovery, and impacted the roof of a commercial building. Both people aboard died.

Loss of Engine Power Factor

The Transport Canada report details the failure of the cylinder in the engine.

Fractured cylinder #3 from the accident engine, with failure due to a fatigue crack in threads 4, 5 and 6, where the aluminum head screws onto the steel cylinder wall. Photo: Transport Canada

Robert Apenis summarizes the report effectively. The report indicates that this fatigue failure could not have been observed without destructive testing. Apparently, this was the first occurrence in this type of IO-360 engine. The cylinder did have 2221 hours in service, having been rehoned 715 hours before the accident. Without further examples of failures, this seems like a single point of failure and not a fleet problem.

Lesson #1: Maintain your airplane diligently, but some failures are rare events. Plan for them.

Mechanical Things Do Fail

Note that the failure of this cylinder was a factor in the accident chain, but not the ultimate cause of the fatal crash. The pilot's actions after the engine lost power continued for some time and determined the sequence of events following the engine problem. Dealing with a loss of engine power is a required task for the FAA Practical Test Standards for private pilot certification. (I presume similar requirements are in place for Canada and other countries.)

Lesson #2: Mechanical things do fail, plan for them and practice your emergency procedures.

Two Pilots at the Controls

One detail from the accident report was that the passenger was also a private pilot with a license issued about 30 days prior to the accident. No information indicates that this was a factor in the accident.

However, when an unusual situation arises, how do you handle it when a second pilot is in the front seat?

Did you and the other pilot discuss who was PIC? Did you brief on the positive transfer of controls? Recall that instructors check these things every time they fly with you. Do you discuss it when you fly with another pilot?

The potential difficulty of another pilot attempting recovery may interfere with your actions. Speaking up is one thing, acting on impulse is another.

Yet another possibility is for the second pilot to actually be given the opportunity to fly the plane. Even the potential for them sitting in the left seat. A couple of Cirrus fatal accidents involved uncertainty as to which pilot was in which front seat. Are you familiar enough with your Cirrus that you can fly reliably from the right seat? If not, don't do it on a whim, or to be generous.

Again, to emphasize, we have no evidence of this in the Buttonville accident investigation. But I raise it as a lesson to learn.

Lesson #3: Two (or more) pilots in the plane can create confusion and different responses. Brief on the ground who is PIC, who will make decisions in the event of an urgent situation, and how the other pilot(s) can contribute to the situation.

Back to Loss of Engine Power during Takeoff Climb

This accident involved reports of smoke coming from the airplane and an obvious mechanical fault -- the fracture of the #3 cylinder. And it happened soon after takeoff, so the altitude was only a few hundred feet.

What would that sound and feel like? One thing is certain -- you want to find out quickly if you still have any power left!

If it a complete loss of power -- silence is your best clue! -- then act immediately. Otherwise, you can do a bit of troubleshooting.

The POH has a section on Engine Partial Power Loss in the Emergency Procedures section. The emergency procedure steps through boost pump, fuel supply, mixture, power, alternate air and ignition. At the CPPP, we recommend a flow by quadrant -- fuel, power, air, ignition -- moving swiftly at lower right upward to the left. Practice these diagnostic steps so that you can find out if there is a quick resolution:

Fuel pump -- BOOST
Fuel selector -- SWITCH
Mixture -- SWEEP for conditions
Power lever -- SWEEP
Alternate Air -- ON
Ignition -- BOTH, L, R

Note that you have two magnetos in part because they fail often. Also, turbo operators may lose the turbo boost but still operate as a normally aspirated engine, just at lower power for the altitude. And your mixture may be changed by your passenger inadvertently. Lots of possibilities.

Aim to accomplish all these tasks within a few seconds. Realize that lingering on these steps uses up time that may result in a loss of altitude.

Lesson #4: If you don't have any power, act immediately.

Lesson #5: Practice the emergency procedures, especially Engine Partial Power Loss, such that you can correct the situation within seconds.

Departure Briefing

Here is the view of the departure end of Buttonville Airport (click for a larger image).

Looks like a lot of commercial and industrial buildings with some residential under the crosswind turn. Note the wreckage was consistent with a turn downwind to return to the airport.

Lesson #6: When arriving at an unfamiliar airport, take a look at the terrain and land use off the ends of the runways, so you can see what will be underneath you on departure.

To maximize your alternatives, CPPP instructors recommend departing at Vy airspeed to gain the most altitude in the shortest time (not Vx that gets you the shortest altitude in the shortest distance, but at the risk of a significantly greater pitch angle and slower airspeed). Aim to gain 500 feet AGL where CAPS becomes viable if activated immediately.

Otherwise, you need to determine where you would put the aircraft down if you have a loss of power at too low an altitude for a survivable CAPS deployment.

Lesson #7: Prepare a departure briefing for every airport and every departure, especially noting the CAPS altitude of 500 feet AGL.

Using CAPS during Takeoff Climb

Consider these choices for when to use CAPS during an emergency during takeoff and departure climb:

Below 500 feet AGL, you have few good options. It takes time to recognize that you are in trouble. It takes time to decide. It takes time to act. All that time may be costing you altitude. Cirrus pilots in the simulator consistently take 5-10 seconds to react and act. Keep the wings level. Avoid turns that will increase your chance of a stall at a higher airspeed in the banked turn. Aim for the most suitable off-airport landing spot. Good luck! Wish you had climbed fast enough ...

Above 500 feet AGL, we know that CAPS is viable. But you don't have much time to do anything else but decide to act.

Above 2000 feet AGL, you now have altitude to consider your options. Maneuver to position your plane for the best outcome, which may be a CAPS pull. Recall that survivable CAPS deployments have landed in trees, shrubs, residential streets, ponds, canals, rivers, oceans, powerlines, mountain slopes, etc.

Lesson #8: Think through your decision criteria for when you will use CAPS in an emergency during takeoff and departure. No one has died when CAPS was activated above 1000' AGL and below 133 knots.

Low Altitude Options for CAPS

How low can you pull and still survive?

There are no limitations on using CAPS. There are observations from the certification tests, but they are not limiting. From level flight, activating CAPS lost 400 feet to level under canopy. From a 1-1/2 turn spin, activating CAPS lost 920 feet from the initiation of the spin to level under canopy.

Accident investigations provide us with this additional data about what happens with low-altitude CAPS pulls:

~500 feet when zooming up after a power-off glide was going to land short of the airport; 1 minor injury, 1 uninjured
441 feet over the ocean after loss of engine power; 1 serious injury
~400 feet during a power-off glide was going to land short of the runway; 1 serious injury, 3 uninjured
~50 feet after first impact with trees during a failed go-around; 1 serious injury

Not all low-altitude CAPS activations are survivable:

528 feet in a spin descending at 100 knots, CAPS activated just 4 seconds prior to impact and reduced vertical velocity to 58 knots; 1 fatal, 3 serious
~50 feet in a spin, witnesses report CAPS observed partially opened; 2 fatal

Lesson #9: Pull Early! If you have altitude and are faced with a risky off-airport landing, then use CAPS early enough to avoid serious injury. You need 8 seconds. That's only a few hundred feet of altitude above ground.

Why Crash with a Usable Rocket and Parachute?

The inventor of the ballistic parachute advocates that you should use CAPS whenever you face a potential high-energy impact. Energy goes up as the square of your velocity. Under CAPS, your vertical velocity is about 20 knots. If you stall the aircraft and crash, your impact velocity is about 60 knots -- or 9 times more energy. If you spin and crash, then the impact velocity may go up to 100 knots -- or 25 times more energy. Lower energy in the crash is good. Faced with landing in uncertain terrain or hitting something hard, pull the CAPS handle. Even if you get the wheels rolling, hitting a stump, ditch, fence, or other hard object can ruin your day.

The CAPS deployment sequence will take 8 seconds, and part of that time will position the airframe in a nose-low attitude. So, this is a consideration for the impact. Fortunately, the Cirrus cockpit has proven to be very strong, and the seat restraints have proven to be very effective. Consider reducing your impact energy as a trade-off for the risk of a nose-low impact.

Lesson #10: Plan to use CAPS to reduce your impact energy.

The Fatal Choice: Stall and Crash

When faced with a takeoff emergency, you have many choices of alternative actions and outcomes.

Land straight ahead
Maneuver with limited power to maintain airspeed and altitude towards a safer off-airport landing site
Pull CAPS handle

The worst possible choice is to stall the aircraft, lose control and impact the ground at flying speeds.

Lesson #11: Do everything you can to avoid stalling the aircraft and losing control.

Regretfully, these lessons come from a fatal Cirrus accident. Please consider them in your recurrent training. Don't make the same choices and have the safe fatal outcome.

Cheers
Rick

Tales of CAPS Pulls -- Guidance for Cirrus Instructors

Rick Beach — Sun, 30 Jan 2011 19:03:00 GMT

At the CPPP in Van Nuys in 2010, we had the good fortune to have two Cirrus pilots who have pulled the CAPS parachute handle and survived. That prompted me to spend a bit of time with each of them to inquire about their experiences. This is the second of a few blog entries that describe aspects of their CAPS pulls.

An interesting aspect of my conversation with James Turpen was his reflections on his instructors and their advice on using CAPS. For the background on his parachute pull, see the first blog in this series: Tales of CAPS Pulls -- The Decision

James credits just one of his several instructors with a focus on the use of CAPS. Granted, the time period of his Cirrus training was several years ago when there were fewer airplanes produced and fewer instructors with significant dual-instruction time in Cirrus airplanes. Nonetheless, James emphasized that only one instructor took the use of CAPS seriously enough to focus his training on deciding when to activate CAPS.

That one instructor was insistent that James consider what he would do in an emergency. He was asked "Should you continue?" when dealing with simulated emergency situations. That instructor advised establishing clear and distinct lines based on the experience level of the pilot under training. Obviously, if you did not yet have much experience, you would set those lines to avoid things you have not practiced or learned yet. And sometimes, if you had lots of experience but not much practice, then those lines might move back into more conservative decisions.

Interesting, he observed that his instructors were proficient at recovery techniques, something that was very different from his experience. They practice more often than he does. They practice more recently than he did. He describes the experience of being surprised when he wasn't expecting it, shifting his attention from navigation to troubleshooting, getting into a high-speed spiral dive (his airspeed reached 224 KTAS in his incident), hearing the wind noise increasing, being disoriented by the strobe lights flashing in the clouds, and ultimately getting a TAWS alert in IMC. These aspects made the real-life situation much different than any training scenario. (Until you go to a simulator with an instructor who has read this blog! )

His instructor and his reading of discussions on COPA forums changed his thinking. He recalls thinking about the 15-turn spin in the Meadview, AZ, crash that took the lives of a family of four. He determined that if in a bad situation, then he was never going to crash without attempting to use CAPS. His instructor gave him the opportunity to practice that determination.

After his CAPS pull, James says he now flies with more attention paid to when he would pull the CAPS handle again.

He encourages any Cirrus pilot to not hesitate to pull. It's not a bad outcome. (See the next installment about his experience with insurance.)

Cheers
Rick

Noting the frequency of CAPS pulls and fatal Cirrus accidents

Rick Beach — Sun, 30 Jan 2011 18:30:00 GMT

During a post-event discussion thread about CAPS pull #30 near Kiowa, CO, I was prompted to prepare a frequency graph that showed the number of CAPS saves over time.

I already had a graph that showed the frequency of fatal Cirrus accidents by quarter, and had color-coded that graph to distinguish the accidents in the dark months (fall and winter, the six months from October to March, or quarters 4 and 1 in a year) from the light months (spring and summer, the six months from April to September, or quarters 2 and 3 in a year).

Adding the CAPS saves provides a visual reminder of the value of the last-resort safety device of the airframe parachute installed in every Cirrus aircraft produced. (Click on the image for a larger view)

Two things jump out at me. First, we've had way too many fatal accidents! Second, the pattern of CAPS pulls has increased over time.

As for my original hypothesis that more Cirrus fatal accidents occur in the winter or dark months, the summer of 2010 showed that trend reversed since the fall of 2009. Maybe there was a big influence from the economic downturn that resulted in less flying, and hence, less fatal accidents. But problems certainly surfaced again in the spring of 2010 and we recorded 8 fatal accidents in just 5 months.

As for the increased frequency of CAPS pulls, we know that several Cirrus pilots have credited the discussions on COPA for influencing their decision criteria. Verle Wiita lowered his decision height from 2500 feet when he read COPA discussions of successful CAPS pulls down to 1,000 feet above ground. Good thing, as he pulled at about 1800 feet over Gaithersburg, MD when he became disoriented. Jim Turpen read the COPA stories about early CAPS saves and credits the work of one of his several instructors who persisted in giving him emergency scenarios for which a CAPS pull would be the best outcome. (He notes that only that one instructor focused on CAPS as a last-resort safety action.) And during the Cirrus Training Partner Symposium in 2010, several CSIP and training center instructors credited the factual discussions on COPA for affirming that CAPS works.

If you fly a Cirrus aircraft, then your training for emergency procedures should be different than other airplanes. Instructors at the Cirrus Pilot Proficiency Program advocate that the first step in such a procedure should be to CONSIDER CAPS! Not to activate it right away, but to remind yourself that you have that option -- and not to progress beyond the design criteria of demonstrated airspeed of 133 knots and loss of altitude of 920 feet in a 1-1/2 turn spin.

As of January 2011, no person in a Cirrus aircraft has died when the CAPS system was activated within those design criteria.

Pull early, pull often!

Cheers
Rick

Partners in Command experience the Simtrain Simulator

Rick Beach — Mon, 17 Jan 2011 23:40:00 GMT

At each of the more popular CPPP weekend recurrent training events, we encourage COPA members to bring their right-seat partners for the Partner in Command (PIC) course. The course spends 3 hours on the Saturday morning exploring how a partner can handle the incapacitation of the pilot -- ways to use the equipment that will ensure a safe return to the ground, including how to pull the CAPS parachute handle.

Mike Radomsky has made a standing offer to all partners who attend the PIC course: if/when in Las Vegas, please stop by the Simtrain simulator at The Flight Academy (in the offices adjacent to Lone Mountain Aviation). There, they are given a hands-on simulated experience of the pilot slumping in the seat.

Here's one testamonial from Cathleen Law, who attended the Concord CPPP in November 2010. She took Mike up on his offer and wrote to the other partners who attended the same course:

On Dec 13, 2010, at 13:15, Cathleen Law wrote:

Hey ladies, hope everyone enjoyed their Thanksgiving holiday.

I have to share with you my experience deploying the parachute in the simulator. After our weekend in Concord, I had the opportunity to meet with Mike Radomsky at North Las Vegas Airport, and actually exercise the training he gave us the week before. It was absolutely amazing and I hope each of you will make the opportunity to do this. The simulator is so realistic...the vibration, the hum, even the terrain on the screens was set to our home area around San Diego. I'm really not very good at play-acting, but everything felt felt so familiar, it seemed real. When Jim "went unconscious" it was really hard to think. If I had not had the laminated card around my neck I would have been lost. It really made me realize that we need to review the information and practice occasionally so it becomes somewhat instinctive. I could see how easy it would be to panic and forget everything I do know.

Thank you to Mike for the opportunity to do this simulation. I encourage all of you to do it as well. Think of it as an excuse to visit Las Vegas!

Happy flying,
Cathy Law

Here's a photograph of the simulator with a partner pulling the CAPS parachute handle. Note the pilot in the left seat is non-responsive and incapacitated, so the partner is doing it all:

Note that some partners may be children, or anyone who often flies with you in the right seat! And here is a photograph of a group of partners from the Las Vegas CPPP, where each of them took turns in the simulator:

Pilots, please encourage your partners to attend the Partner in Command course. Most CPPP events will hold this course on Saturday mornings, followed by lunch, followed by a special course on Aviation Survival presented by Doug Ritter of Equipped to Survive. After that, the partners are free to enjoy the weekend, often in small groups of partners who go off to visit the local sights.

COPA members often report that these PIC courses made a huge difference in the comfort level and self-confidence of their partners, flying in the Cirrus.

Cheers
Rick

Tales of CAPS Pulls -- The Decision

Rick Beach — Sun, 17 Oct 2010 22:54:00 GMT

At the recent CPPP in Van Nuys, we had the good fortune to have two Cirrus pilots who have pulled the CAPS parachute handle and survived. That prompted me to spend a bit of time with each of them to inquire about their experiences. This is the first of a few blog entries that describe aspects of their CAPS pulls.

What goes through the mind of a Cirrus pilot when they decide to activate the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS)?

Every Cirrus built has one. But few pilots actually use one.

Bill Graham pulls while inverted after high-altitude loss of control

Bill Graham was flying with his wife Barbara in 2004 returning from another Cirrus Pilot Proficiency Program (CPPP) event. (See the Peters, CA CAPS pull page) As he climbed over a rising stratus layer of clouds, the plane entered an uncommanded wing drop due to what we now believe was an autopilot-induced stall. Bill is an aerobatic instructor and knows how to recover from unusual attitudes and spins. This situation was different. The plane was doing things without his inputs and what he tried wasn't working. So, before he entered the clouds and lost his horizon, he decided to pull the CAPS handle. No hesitation. He recalls that after teaching the Normal and Emergency Procedures course at the CPPP, he was primed to act. What was a surprise to me was that Bill describes the plane as being upside down, inverted, when he pulled. Perhaps that explains the delay he perceived after the handle pull and before he saw the parachute risers through the windshield.

Bill's decision was immediate. The plane was out of his control. He knew how to recover but the plane did not respond. So, he activated CAPS when he had lost control of the plane.

James Turpen pulls after recalling several Cirrus accidents

James Turpen was flying from Albuquerque to Denver when he noticed his airspeed dropping in cruise. (See the Luna, NM CAPS pull page.) He lowered the nose to gain airspeed, but the indicated airspeed kept dropping and soon was replaced by red-Xs on the PFD. Based on the symptoms, he realized that the pitot tube had probably frozen and he activated the switch -- except it turned out to be the TKS Max switch. Ultimately, he turned on the pitot heat and regained his altimeter, where he noticed the whistling sound from excessive airspeed (recorded to be 224 KIAS) and the plane was down to 11,000 feet -- a loss of about 5,000 feet! So, he started pulling back to gain altitude and slow the airplane. Then he got a terrain alert -- Pull Up! Pull Up! In IMC.

James describes three recollections that went through his mind as he was dealing with this abnormal situation:

Not too fast!
He recalled the Lake Tahoe icing accident in which the plane was traveling so fast that the parachute ripped off the airframe. (See the Norden, CA accident.) James didn't want to be going too fast, so he was pulling up when he got the terrain alert -- and he pulled up harder!

Not too late!
One of his instructors had reviewed several Cirrus accidents, including the one in which the family died when their plane corkscrewed into a mountain without pulling the CAPS handle. (See the Meadview, AZ accident.) James was certain that he didn't want to keep going in a bad situation, in IMC, without giving himself time to activate CAPS. With the terrain alert, he decided then to pull the CAPS handle, but he waited until he lost some airspeed.

Keep the engine for maneuvering (not!)
James recalled the pilot who pulled the parachute and claimed that he maneuvered away from some obstacles (fuel tanks), so he thought about keeping his engine running. (See the Haverstraw, NY CAPS pull.) However, as it turned out, he has learned some things on his way down under canopy, so keep reading below.

In this scenario, James had decided to pull the parachute handle, was acting to raise the nose to slow the plane (Not too fast!), but wasn't going to wait much longer (Not too late!). James pulled the handle while inverted at the top of a loop, something that he didn't realize at the time, but learned years later from the reconstruction video. (See the video in the Safety media gallery.)

What did James learn about his decision?

Within 8 seconds, the plane righted itself and was level under canopy. That worked!

As the plane emerged from the clouds, James could see that he was descending into a valley. And there was a farm house. And he was headed straight for it. Great! He just pulled the parachute to save the day, and he now he was about to crash into the only structure around for miles!

But that's why he kept the engine running. Except it didn't do anything for him.

We know from the recorded flight data that the plane was turning like a carousel under canopy with the engine running, simply twirling around under that huge 2400 square foot round canopy. Despite his best efforts and intentions, nothing happened. There was no benefit. He turned the engine off. The plane weathervaned into the prevailing winds.

Fortunately, the plane drifted over the top of the farm house and began hitting tree branches to slow down his impact sequence. One he landed, the parachute slowly, gently, deliberately, turned the plane over on its roof. James was now suspended in his seat belts. But he make one last radio call before calmly releasing himself and rolling his feet over his head and out the door. At least he knew where that farm house was, and he headed there to call for help.

For Bill and James, their decisions were greatly influenced by what they had learned about the Cirrus parachute system before they needed it. Bill taught the use of CAPS. James heard about it from one of his instructors (more about that in another blog). Both used it and survived.

Cheers
Rick

BRS Founder Boris Popov on the Cirrus parachute system

Rick Beach — Mon, 27 Sep 2010 02:46:00 GMT

Note: as a sponsor of the recent KANE CPPP, BRS Aerospace was invited to speak to the group of assembled Cirrus pilots and instructors. Boris Popov, founder and VP of BRS Aerospace and inventor of the ballistic parachute system, spoke during our lunch break and held an extensive Q&A session. He provided me with his remarks in the form of a blog, which I am presenting here on his behalf.

As the founder of BRS, and having received in my hand the first ever check from Alan Klapmeier to initiate the development of the BRS parachute for the Cirrus CAPS system, I have followed with considerable interest the recent dialogue on the COPA web site, and other web sites, whenever the subject of parachute deployment arises.

It's hard to overstate the level of frustration, and concern, we at BRS have had for the last decade with the lack of adequate training and the misunderstood capabilities of ballistically deployed parachute systems. There is absolutely no doubt in our minds that pilots and passengers are dying needlessly due to this untenable situation ... and we at BRS are initiating programs to help mitigate it.

Our primary concern is the apparent unwillingness, or hesitation, to deploy in a broad spectrum of actual emergency scenarios. This subject has been widely and deeply discussed on this COPA website, with Rick Beach's long standing commentary well thought out and elegantly presented. "Pull early, pull often" is a good mantra to follow, for reasons that may surprise you.

After 255 saved lives, 30 years in the ballistic parachute business, and nearly 35,000 systems sold worldwide, we know our product and our markets well. Currently (and during the decades of developing the system) many of the staff at BRS are licensed pilots with experience from hang gliding through sophisticated high-performance aircraft. Some of us even survived structural failures and other life-threatening emergency situations. We've been there, in the air, making a decision most pilots will never have to make. This melding of expertise in flying and designing emergency parachutes gives us a unique and valuable perspective on when and where one makes that decision to trade a likely deadly experience into one still frightening, but survivable one.

Here are some hard supportable data about the capabilities and performance expectations of a BRS ballistic parachute:

Minimum deployment altitude

1) We have documented (video/eyewitnesses) of saves occurring where pilots have activated a BRS ultralight system below 200 feet AGL, one even at 100' AGL. Although these were not Cirrus-size chutes, it nonetheless points out the extraordinary capabilities of a rocket-deployed parachute. Keep in mind that your airspeed, parachute size, and the descent angle all affect your opening times and your minimum altitude to achieve FULL deployment.

Drag/brake chute on the ground

2) The initial extraction process of a parachute deployment creates significant parasitic drag. At the least, this creates a nose-up attitude that could be critical in changing a deadly vertical or near vertical impact into an energy-dissipating glancing bounce, and should occur within a half second after activating the system. Pilots do not seem to appreciate what a great big drag/brake chute they have on board, capable of quickly stopping forward velocity even on the ground.

Pull Early, Pull Often, and Keep Pulling!

3) We suspect at least a few pilots thought they had a malfunctioning activating handle when in fact they simply had not pulled the handle with enough force to activate the system. It needs to be stressed that one not only pulls early, pulls often...but continues to pull/yank until activation occurs. Perhaps we should cease using the word "pull" and use "yank" as it implies a harder, quicker action better describing the necessary activating forces. (BRS is currently developing an electronically activated system that should provide more versatility in locating the activating handle, and in activation effectiveness)

Steering with power under canopy

4) Through the process of performing dozens of in-air deployments in various aircraft, we have found that in many cases the aircraft is somewhat "steerable" under the canopy. Our test pilots were able to steer the parachute in early tests with Pitts and Cessna 150 aircraft, although they have different parachutes and weights from a Cirrus. This applies only to tractor prop configurations. During one Cirrus deployment the pilot thought he was able to "steer" the aircraft under canopy away from a power plant and to a nearby open area. Later I've learned from Rick Beach that might have been the direction of the prevailing winds. If you find yourself in such a situation with a tractor prop driven airplane, use the power of the engine to provide some ability to steer towards a desirable landing area.

When to pull the handle?

I am asked quite often under what situation I would deploy a BRS parachute. There are many and most of us have heard/read the typical ones. Bottom line for me is "I WILL PULL THE HANDLE WHEN I HAVE LOST CONTROL OF THE AIRPLANE AT ANY ALTITUDE." When you have lost control of your aircraft, a parachute deployment will not regain control of the aircraft, but likely allow you to regain control of the situation.

When you need it, use it!

Seems most pilots of parachute-equipped aircraft believe there is some empirically based magic altitude where a go/no go exists. Not true. If I have lost control of the aircraft after a particularly bad landing and am veering out of control at 50 feet altitude towards a tree line/fence/building -- use the chute as a very expensive drag chute. Even at the normal landing/approach speeds you will most probably have a fairly quick opening that will decelerate your aircraft to survivable speeds -- if you make the decision in time. My philosophy is that whenever I find myself in a potential deployment situation, I will first continue to try to solve the problem by flying the aircraft with one hand on the stick/yoke, while the other hand will be on the activating handle ready for an immediate pull. Always keep in mind that it typically takes 3-4 seconds to decide to deploy, reach the handle, and pull the handle. A 1500 ft/min descent equates to 75 to100 feet lost just for this process alone. The parachute canopy, suspension lines, and risers total about 88 feet, adding to the distance required for FULL deployment. (With any kind of glide angle, which most commonly occurs, these distances would be worst case). When you need it, use it!

With the above in mind, BRS has embarked on a process to provide updated procedural training and better disseminate accurate capabilities of rocket-deployed parachutes. We will provide one hour of full-motion simulator training, recreating both successful and unsuccessful parachute deployments, for every general aviation repack order we receive. We will do so via publishing hard data on actual saves, and be more proactive on pertinent blog/forums focused on aviation safety.

We have a proven safety device that has saved hundreds of lives, and will save even more through better education and training. We owe that much to ourselves and all those fly with us, as well as upcoming pilots who expect nothing less.

Boris Popov

CAPS criteria on departure -- the presentation

Rick Beach — Mon, 30 Aug 2010 17:01:00 GMT

What do you plan to do when bad things happen on departure?

Have a loss of engine power on take off? Hit a bird that damages the airplane sufficiently to make it hard to control?

In a Cirrus, with the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System, pilots have a unique opportunity to use this last-resort safety option. Except, you don't have the time to think about it during the moment. Cirrus pilots must decide before taking off what they will do when you lose engine power on departure.

Here is the presentation slide that we now use in the Normal and Emergency Procedures section of the Cirrus Pilot Proficiency Program (CPPP). Credit for these ideas go to seminal work by The Flight Academy and Simtrain, the folks who train a lot of Cirrus pilots and provide full-motion simulator experiences. See these blogs CAPS ADM Defined and Here's when you use the CAPS:

Upon take-off, climb at Vy to get to CAPS altitude in the least amount of time (and not Vx to get there in the least amount of distance). The 500' AGL and 2000' AGL are guidelines, so for each departure, determine what altimeter reading corresponds to the decision points and make call-outs to emphasize what you would do next:

Below 500' AGL, NO CAPS
Above 500' AGL, CAPS NOW!
Above 2000' AGL, Consider CAPS

The demonstrated loss of altitude when CAPS was activated in level flight was 400 feet. In a 1-1/2 spin, the demonstrated loss of altitude was 920 feet. In a climb, perhaps you can delay a few moments and still have enough altitude for CAPS viability. Below that viable altitude, you have few good options, so plan to land straight ahead and reduce impact energy as much as possible. Do not stall the aircraft! That will point the nose down and increase the likelihood of a severe impact and consequent injury to people in the plane.

Above 500' AGL, CAPS is viable. Except it takes a few moments to recognize that bad things are happening and then a few moments more to decide what to do, and a few moments more to actually reach up to the CAPS handle and activate the system -- pull the CAPS handle forward out of the holder and then use both hands to pull down. Realize that those few moments add up quickly. Too many and you will have lost too much altitude for CAPS to fully deploy.

Above 2000' AGL, you have both altitude and time to consider your options. But set a hard floor that if you do not have a landing assured when you cross 1000' AGL, you will pull the CAPS handle. Return-to-the-airport maneuvers are challenging, and often not successful, resulting in stalls with nose-first impacts or in an uncontrolled stall/spin into the ground. For reference, CPPP prohibits practicing return to airport maneuvers below 3,000 feet AGL. And remember that at best glide of 88 knots the aircraft descends at 900 fpm, giving you limited time to decide and act.

When pilots have gone into the simulator to practice departures with loss of engine power, even with these criteria in mind, they often fail to react quickly enough. We mean it when we say CAPS NOW!

Think it, practice it, do it!

Cheers
Rick

A Photo Story of Landing a Cirrus

Rick Beach — Tue, 08 Jun 2010 04:12:00 GMT

Getting tired of reading about Cirrus landing accidents? We've seen a lot of them. Let's do something about them. But first, why so many?

A common factor emerges: landing with excessive speed.

But then how should you land a Cirrus? And how do you land your Cirrus? If you do it differently, then what are the risks?

To find out, I spent some time reviewing recent COPA forum threads, such as Airspeeds - Landing Poll SR22 Only and Another, ho-hum, landing incident/prop strike and the recent accident thread SR-22 landing mishap in Mulege, Baja Sur.

And those threads convinced me of two things: 1) people are using the same words to describe different things, and 2) I needed to see this for myself.

So, at the recent Cirrus Pilot Proficiency Program at Evansville, IN, I took my camera out on the ramp and photographed two CPPP instructors while they flew Cirrus SR22 and landed them in front of me. The first helped me with my photographic technique, but my camera failed me and the picture were out of focus. The second attempt was perfect.

Here's a sequence of photos of the landing, taken from south to north on runway 36 at KEVV. (Click to see a larger view, or see the full-sized photographs below.)

Very pretty airplane, very pretty landing. (FYI, this is N430CD, a Worpe9 variant of the SR22 from Next Generation Aircraft with a refit TAT Turbo engine, Avidyne Release 9 avionics, updated interior and new paint scheme; but of course, that had nothing to do with the landing, eh?) We'll use the paint scheme to highlight the attitude as the plane progresses through the landing sequence.

Factors in Cirrus Landing Accidents

But back to the landing accidents in a Cirrus. At least 30 aircraft have had substantial damage due to landing accidents, at least two of them fatal: Gurupi, Brazil when the wing tip touched the ground and the plane cartwheeled killing the pilot, and Crystal, MN when landing in rain and the plane failed to execute a go around after touching down. These accidents involve many variations of problems, such as loss of directional control after touchdown, pilot induced oscillations, and running off the end of the runway.

A common factor, not necessarily the cause but something that stands out, emerges: excessive landing speed.

What the POH says about Normal Landings

Here's what the POH states (see page 4-18 in the section on Normal Procedures):

Normal landing approaches can be made with power on or off with
any flap setting desired. Surface winds and air turbulence are usually
the primary factors in determining the most comfortable approach
speeds.

Actual touchdown should be made with power off and on the main
wheels first to reduce the landing speed and subsequent need for
braking. Gently lower the nose wheel to the runway after airplane
speed has diminished. This is especially important for rough or soft
field landings.

Seems simple enough, eh? Approach can be in any configuration. Conditions may determine speeds. Touchdown on the main wheels first. Lower the nose wheel after speed has diminished.

Unfortunately, training was overtaken by events. Tail strikes happened frequently enough in new airplanes during transition training that instructors began adding more speed to keep the plane from dropping onto the runway. A bit of a good thing gone bad!

What does the Flight Operations Manual say about Normal Landings

Another guiding document from Cirrus Aircraft gives instructors and pilots standardized procedures. Here's the section on Normal Landings (see page 3-66 in the section on Standard Operating Procedures):

Normal landings should be made with 100% flaps. Final approach
speeds should be adjusted to account for gusts exceeding 10 KTS by
adding half of the gust factor. Reduce power smoothly and begin
slowing from the final approach speed at a time that allows an easy
transition from final descent to round out and flare with minimum
floating or ballooning. Touch downs should be made on the main
wheels first at speeds slightly above stall. Gently lower the nose wheel
after the mains are on the ground.

More rigorous than the POH and more descriptive of the technique. Introduces the distinctions of final approach, round out, flare and touch down. However, this remains consistent with POH.

A great diagram is also provided to show the airspeeds and configurations in the traffic pattern:

What do we mean by "landing speeds"?

So, if the guidance is consistent and standard, why do we have a problem? Seems that people use the phrase "landing speed" to refer to different phases of the normal landing procedure. Here's my take on the distinctions:

final approach speed: the airspeed with 100% flaps during the descent towards the runway
short final speed: the airspeed for the last part of the final approach, often less than a mile down to about a quarter mile
over the fence speed: a colloquial term without precision, because where is the fence in relation to the runway threshold
over the numbers speed: another colloquial term that at least refers to the landing portion of the runway beyond the threshold
Vref speed: airspeed for crossing the landing threshold of the runway, defined as 1.3 times Vso, the stall speed in landing configuration at most unfavorable weight & balance
round out: the transition from nose-down attitude during final approach to nose slightly high to enter ground effect over the runway
flare: the nose slightly high attitude as airspeed decreases in ground effect prior to touch down
touch down speed: slightly above Vso, the full stall speed

What does it look like to land this way?

Frankly, that's a lot of words. So, what does it look like when a plane is landed according to the Flight Operations Manual and the POH? Here's the overview and then we can review each photograph.

Short final, about 1/4 mile from the runway threshold, 80 KIAS, 100% flaps, attitude slightly nose down (doesn't the paint scheme really help here?!)

Reducing power to slow from short final speed of 80 knots to Vref speed of 75 knots.

Vref at 75 knots over the threshold markings on the runway. (Runway 36 at KEVV has a displaced threshold and it is visible in the heat haze.) This airplane is a turbo with a composite prop, and the plane will decelerate quite rapidly as the power is pulled back, so expect the descent rate to increase. Note that the attitude is still slightly nose down.

Round out and flare brings the nose up slightly with smooth application of elevator pitch. Speed decreases as plane flies in ground effect.

Touch down on the main wheels at a speed just above Vso stall speed of 60 KIAS, with nose wheel still off the ground in a slightly nose up attitude. Note that this is not "flying it onto the runway" but rather holding it off the runway until speed decreases to let the plane settle down out of ground effect. The main wheels touch first and the plane continues to roll until the nose wheel drops.

Holding the nose wheel off the ground after touch down. Note the elevator position keeping the attitude slightly nose high. The pitch attitude does not require much angle of attack to maintain the nose wheel off the runway.

Nose wheel down. Note elevator position indicates some remaining pitch control.

Completed landing and application of brakes. Very pretty airplane, nicely landed.

Your landing check ride

We encourage you to fly with a safety pilot or an instructor to review what airspeeds you fly when landing. They can call out or write down the speeds on short final, across the threshold, as you round out and flare and touch down. They might also note the position on the runway where you round out and touch down.

What can go wrong?

This landing was typical of what the CPPP flight instructors seek as proficiency in Cirrus pilots. Unfortunately, not everyone comes with good landing habits. What can go wrong?

float forever: if the speed over the threshold is too great, it may take a long, long, long time for the plane to slow down.
nose wheel lands first: flying the plane onto the runway risks touching the nose wheel first, and that may cause a rebound into the air and starting a pilot induced oscillation
planting the main gear onto the runway: forcing the plane to touch down before it has stopped flying means it may start flying again before you are slowed down enough; why? a gust of wind may provide lift, or a bump in the runway surface may provide upward thrust, or the main gear spring into action and provide upward thrust on their own
brake lockup: with a free castering nose wheel, you may have directional control problems if the brakes lock up unevenly

Proficiency in landing will reduce risk of accidents

Become proficient yourself. Watch for other Cirrus pilots who carry excessive speed in their landings. Tactfully intercede. Help them become proficient and avoid an accident.

Cheers
Rick

On the distinctions of CAPS pulls, activations, deployments, fatalities and saves

Rick Beach — Sun, 18 Apr 2010 18:28:00 GMT

Doing some work on updating the Cirrus accident statistics information, largely prompted by Carol Jensen's recent work with updating CDM charts.

That gave rise to clarifying how we distinguish the kinds of information about CAPS parachute pulls. I would appreciate your thoughts on these distinctions:

CAPS activation -- a pre-impact initiation of the CAPS system, possibly intentionally by someone in the plane or by physical forces, and not including post-impact activations
CAPS deployment -- the familiar scene of a round parachute with a Cirrus underneath
CAPS save -- the survival of someone in the aircraft after a CAPS deployment

Hence, for a CAPS save to occur, there must be a CAPS deployment and a CAPS activation.

What gets messy is when bad things happen and people are injured or die involving CAPS. Here are all of the situations where something didn't go right with CAPS involved:

Lexington, KY -- not a CAPS activation, because of the witness reports that the rocket fired off after impact after a survivable emergency off-airport landing
Norden, CA -- a CAPS activation, although we cannot confirm if by pilot action or physical forces due to the excessive airspeed descent, but not a CAPS deployment because the parachute separated from the airframe and not a CAPS save because the fatality of the only person aboard
Indianapolis, IN -- a CAPS activation by the passenger and a CAPS deployment, even though it was incomplete, and a CAPS save, because three people survived even though the pilot was fatally injured
Sydney, Australia -- a CAPS activation because of the actions of the pilot, but not a CAPS deployment because of a malfunction of the pick-up collar, later addressed by an airworthiness directive, and hence not a CAPS save.
Deltona, FL -- a CAPS activation and a CAPS deployment but not a CAPS save because while the parachute opened the aircraft impacted trees and terrain with sufficient force to kill both people aboard
Boulder, CO -- a CAPS activation, although likely from the force of the midair collision and less likely from a deliberate act by someone in the airplane, and a CAPS deployment because we saw the aircraft descend under canopy but not a CAPS save because both people perished

Now, there is another dimension to add to these distinctions -- was the system operated within the design parameters? Not too fast and not too low.

Norden -- too fast
Indianapolis -- too low
Deltona -- too low

Where this is headed is to try and avoid the notion of failure to save someone from injury or fatality. In my opinion, we are better served by distinguishing what happened and what resulted.

2010 Q1 ends with improved Cirrus safety record

Rick Beach — Sun, 18 Apr 2010 17:31:00 GMT

As of mid-April 2010, the fatal accident rate of Cirrus aircraft has improved. Certainly fewer fatal accidents (four) in the dark, winter months of 2009-2010 than any of the previous winters (seven, nine, seven) since 2005-2006.

Note that the fleet has doubled in size since then. Perhaps this is due to fewer planes flying. Perhaps this is due to the COPA safety outreach to all Cirrus owners by sending them complementary copies of the Cirrus Pilot magazine safety issue in the fall last year.

The fatal accident rate shows this decline

Cirrus aircraft have had 1.63 fatal accidents per 100,000 flight hours in the past 12 months and 1.47 in the past 36 months, which compares favorably with overall GA rate of 1.33 in 2009. (Recall that that rate includes twin engine and jet operations.)

Good news.

However, COPA members were involved in four fatal accidents in 2009:

Manfred Stolle died in a crash short of the runway at Moncks Corner, SC after reporting smoke in the cockpit
Nahum Sharfman died in a crash during a trip to E7 in Elba on the Greek island of Kefalonia in bad weather
William (Skip) Beck died in a return-to-the-runway crash at Rock Hill, SC
Mark Nichter died in a crash off the coast of Florida after departing St. Petersburg, FL

Many discussions and lessons learned have come from COPA discussions of Cirrus accidents. For more details, see the wiki Cirrus Accident History.

Cheers
Rick

Tale of a scud runner -- Me!

Rick Beach — Tue, 09 Mar 2010 00:56:00 GMT

Getting home from the Las Vegas CPPP proved challenging for many participants, including me. The weather turned cold and cloudy on Sunday morning and prevented any flight segments. (Thanks to Kelly Rudy for organizing two tours of the Las Vegas TRACON and McCarran tower!)

By 3pm at the end of the CPPP, the weather looked like VFR ceilings would enable me to fly down the Colorado River valley then hook a right along Interstate 10 and end up at Palm Springs to visit family, a flight without ever going into a cold, moist cloud. Fortunately, I wasn’t attempting to get to San Diego, where the terrain would have forced me to climb into the freezing levels in IMC.

As the Chair of the CPPP, one of my last duties involves collecting flight training records from CPPP flight instructors, many of whom commented on my planned departure. Several made skeptical remarks, a couple volunteered weather updates, and one just shook his head.

And as the COPA safety zealot, I’m always acutely aware of the potential headline should I become involved in a pilot-induced accident!

Turns out that I took off, made it about 10 miles south of the dam, turned back and had dinner with several CPPP instructors, who promptly grilled me about my decision process. After the discussion, they encouraged me to add it as an object lesson for other COPA members. Here goes ...

The 5 P’s

Those who have attended CPPP on the west coast know that I often teach the Single Pilot Resource Management session. This scenario-based training module emphasizes the 5 P’s for expanding your situational awareness and practices taking action to mitigate or eliminate risks. Since that’s how I do my flight planning, let me share how I handled this scud running flight. By the way, the 5 P’s are the Plan, the Pilot, the Plane, the Passengers and the Programming.

The Plan (Actually Plural, Plans)

While I don’t teach it this way, in reality my flight planning usually creates several possible alternatives depending on what I expect will happen during the flight. No different this time. And all of this was thought through on the ground before I departed the flight planning room.

Plan A – Fly VFR under the bases

In the Las Vegas area, there were definite ceilings that were VFR, and at each of the airports with TAFs along the way, there were also VFR ceilings. The ceilings had been rising in the afternoon (good) with occasional rain showers (bad) but nothing terribly stormy. Visibilities during the day had been quite good except for the occasional showers. (Insert requisite caution about TAF forecasts being valid for only a few miles around an airport and not for the terrain between airports.)

Plan A was to fly VFR under the bases of the ceilings along the low terrain of the Colorado River valley south from the Las Vegas area towards the Needles VOR and then Parker VOR and then Blythe VOR, but actually following the river. When I got to the Blythe area, I’d find the Interstate and head west towards Palm Springs. Guess I was combining I-Follow-Rivers with the I-Follow-Roads technique!

Furthermore, I would only depart if I had two hours flying time to land about an hour before sunset in the Palm Springs area. I really wanted to see where I was going while under the clouds.

Plan B – No bases, then loiter to see if the weather changes

This weather system appeared to be slowly moving eastward with rain shafts in spots. One of the CPPP instructors even pointed out the rain over the Lake Mead area as I was close to departure. But the radar and the observable weather showed rather spotty areas of precipitation that was shifting around.

Plan B was to loiter in a clear area and see what changed. If it got better soon enough, then back to Plan A, and if not, then onto Plan C.

Plan C – No VFR conditions to continue, then return VFR to Las Vegas

A critical component of my decision making was knowing that COPA had arranged with the hotel to extend the weekend rate to any Cirrus pilot who had to return due to weather. Several people simply never checked out and extended their stays, but we knew that some might try to get out and be forced to return. We offered that out. I knew it and was willing to accept it.

Plan C was to turn around and fly back using the VFR arrival procedure into North Las Vegas (the Cortez arrival from Lake Mead). This made the flight more of an attempt to get to Palm Springs rather than a trip to Palm Springs. For me, that difference is really important.

Plan D – Worst case with no VFR conditions on the return

From talking with Kelly Rudy about Minimum Vectoring Altitudes in the Las Vegas area and watching the freezing levels in the valley, I knew that I’d have the opportunity to climb into the clouds, wait for a pop-up IFR clearance back to North Las Vegas at 4,000 or 6,000 feet, and be able to get back. This was a return and not a departure, so I didn’t need high MEAs to avoid terrain, just modest altitudes to mix it up with LAS arrivals and get to KVGT.

What I didn’t know was how the afternoon temps were cooling off, so I planned to watch the temps as I departed and set my point of no return accordingly.

The Pilot

My flying experience is about 2,800 hours, all but 65 hours in Cirrus aircraft. Most of my trips involve long cross-country legs. I have flown in California for 8 winters, exclusively VFR or VFR-on-Top to see to avoid the cold clouds.

Almost exclusively! This winter differs because of El Nino. The warm ocean currents have created warm winter storms with higher freezing levels, so I’ve twice flown IFR at MEAs that are warm enough to avoid icing.

I acknowledged some fatigue after organizing the CPPP weekend. And the Las Vegas event involved more improvisation than usual!

While I am not a certified instructor, I have taught all of the CPPP ground courses except the avionics modules. That includes the weather courses, engine management and especially the Single Pilot Resource Management course.

And I’ve practiced the 5 P’s technique for 5 years in lots of real-life scenarios.

The Plane

N858CD is an antique SR22, serial number 127, produced in Dec 2001. The engine has 2800 hours since new with a top overhaul at 2200 hours. Engine operation is almost exclusively LOP, using the Big Mixture Pull with 12.5 gph at 9,500 or 15 gph at 5,500 common operating.

Coincidentally, my ARNAV ICDS 2000 MFD is INOP and due for shipment to Sagem for repairs, so I do not have that cool terrain profile view that I like so much, nor a big moving map, nor engine monitoring. However, I have a Sandel HSI with moving map, and two WAAS capable Garmin 430s with terrain databases. Navdata databases are current. Plane is legit for IFR operation, as well as VFR operation.

Onboard weather with a Garmin 496 with XM subscription.

Plane was full of fuel and weight and balance showed a center CG thanks to the two boxes of Cirrus Pilot safety issue in the baggage compartment. Plane equipped with portable oxygen with Oxyarm delivery.

The Passengers

None. No distractions, but no helpers, just me.

The Programming

Flight plan was KVGT - KIDDS - IRISH - EED - P20 - BLH - L64 - L77 - TRM - KUDD @ 3500 feet. Note that I put several airports in the flight plan, both as alternate diversions and to keep my magenta line close to the Colorado River. Altitude preselect was 3500 feet.

Sandel showed the GPS flight plan course line and bearing pointer to the next waypoint, and I used heading mode to meander.

Garmin #1 showed the flight plan with the Colorado River in blue with the Arizona/Nevada state line in dashed white. Map data blocks showed ground speed, time to next waypoint, desired track to next waypoint, and vertical speed rate. Garmin #2 showed the terrain with yellow identifying the terrain less than 1,000 feet below me.

No ARNAV MFD.

iPhone-equipped with Foreflight mobile with VFR and IFR charts for NV and CA, along with AOPA directory.

Also have paper charts for Las Vegas VFR and Low Enroute IFR, as well as paper procedures books for AZ, NV and CA.

What Actually Happened

The Single Pilot Resource Management course recommends reviewing the 5 P’s at several decision points: before leaving the flight planning room, before leaving the ground, every hour en route, before descending, before initiating an approach. Here’s what happened in my flight.

Before Leaving the Flight Planning Room

Looking at the sky gave me some confidence that there was light to see, there was a definite VFR ceiling, and there were some areas of rain to avoid. 5-minute radar showed a band of moisture across my path and satellite view showed a break in the cloud cover opening up where I wanted to go. I got some local guidance on VFR departures. Proceed with Plan A.

Before Leaving the Ground

North Las Vegas ground gave me a VFR departure that would take me north heading 340 to avoid LAS Class Bravo airspace and set up my flight following request. I set the heading in my Sandel and was ready to go.

First Leg to Hoover Dam

Took off from runway 07 and climbed in a left turn to 340 and contacted Nellis AFB. Got radar identification and was given instructions that when reaching 4,000 feet turn heading 090. Ceiling was indeed above me at about 5,000 MSL. And I could see the lake without concern for rain showers. Continue with Plan A.

Nellis handed me off to Las Vegas Approach who cleared me to 5,500. Replied “unable due to clouds, request 3,500”, which was approved. Began my own navigation over the lake towards the dam. Got dropped because I was below radar coverage, squawk VFR, which I had expected.

Had a bit of difficulty figuring out the location of the dam since the channel is hidden from the lake behind some hills. Reviewed my position on the Garmin map with the VFR Terminal Chart. Saw the river below the dam come into view. Saw the new suspension bridge under construction. Saw the dam. Confirmed VFR at 3,500 MSL would keep me under the ceilings and above the terrain. Continue with Plan A.

Beyond Hoover Dam

Meandering along the river was actually fun. Had a great sightseeing view of the river and the surrounding terrain. The Garmin terrain display clearly showed the river valley between areas of yellow, which was terrain less than 1,000 feet below me. Easy to keep myself clear of terrain. Slowed down a bit to 120 knots, partly to ease my maneuvering and partly to enjoy the view more.

Did a wind check to determine the windward side of the canyon. Had learned from the Cory Lidle accident how to use the wind to shorten a U-turn. But needed to choose the correct side of the canyon. Winds were modest 7 knots from the east, directly across my path. Chose to fly along the western edge of the canyon and that gave me a wonderful view of the river from my window.

WINGS intersection

At this point, I encountered clouds down into the valley and blocking my progress. The chart showed WINGS intersection and a slight ridge that was topped with clouds.

Switch to Plan B.

Clouds seemed in motion across the canyon and I was flying in a clear bowl about 1,000 feet above terrain with cloud bases well above me. Decided to loiter a bit and did some figure-8 maneuvers at 100 to 90 knots with flaps 50%. Spent about 15 minutes while watching the clouds change.

Unfortunately, this was the front. The clouds were changing and moving across the canyon as I expected, but new clouds emerged and filled the canyon. Later I learned that the front stalled southwest of Las Vegas, exactly where I was loitering, and simply rotated all night long with clouds, rain in a never ending cycle. I was never going to get past it.

Still had daylight, still had definite ceilings, so switch to Plan C. Flew a U-turn towards the wind and returned to the Hoover Dam and Lake Mead.

Cortez Arrival

As I got to Lake Mead, turned towards Las Vegas and called up approach and requested the Cortez Arrival procedure back to North Las Vegas airport. I was already at 3500 MSL so simply flew the arrival. Weather over Las Vegas had higher ceilings and so enjoyed the flight over the city and wondered who would be available for dinner!

Debrief at Dinner

One of my pleasures of chairing the CPPP events comes from the interactions of so many talented instructors. Made a few calls and arranged dinner with some after checking back into the CPPP hotel. Expected a grilling, and not just my seafood!

First topic of discussion, “So Rick, describe your decision process for this flight?” Couple of comments about the headlines if the COPA safety guru was involved in a scud-running accident. Genuine surprise at my worst-case plan to pop up and return IFR because the MVA enabled it from that area. And encouragement to post this as an object lesson.

Lessons Learned

Personal minimums are personal. They reflect the personal experience levels, risk assessments, risk tolerance, knowledge and skills of the pilot setting the minimums. Each pilot has to determine what minimums are acceptable to them, with their experience, with their proficiency, with their

This is definitely a do-as-I-say scenario. Just because some other pilot did something does not fully explain why they accepted that risk. Hopefully, by explaining my thought process, you can appreciate that a lot of thinking went into hundreds of decisions along the way.

And if you do not fully appreciate how you would handle similar risks, then please do not expose yourself to them.

Cheers 
Rick

Pull early, pull often!

Early Reflections on CAPS Pull #32 by Dick McGlaughlin in the Bahamas

Does your engine sound different flying over water?

Haiti Beckons

The Engine Stops Over Water

Emergency Landing on Water: To Ditch or Pull CAPS Handle?

The Rocket Goes Off!

Simulating The Cirrus Parachute

Water Splash Down

Coast Guard Rescue

Lessons for Cirrus Pilots

Observing a dramatic reduction in Cirrus fatal accidents

Ban low-speed flying "phobia" -- insights from John King for Cirrus pilots

Ban low airspeed phobia

Most people think

Let's consider

An imminent stall caused by flying too slow

A stall caused by anincrease in load factor

Flight instructors are afraid their students will stall

The result is

Radius of turn versus airspeed

Bank Angle vs Airspeed

Reflections on Cirrus fatal #65 at Chapel Hill, NC on 12 July 2010

Planning to Land at an Unfamiliar Airport

Choosing the Runway at an Unfamiliar Airport

Landing Speeds

Landing Too Fast and Bouncing on the Runway

The Go Around Decision

The Go Around Procedure

Lazy Right Foot Syndrome

Pilots Who Fly With Other Pilots

Acknowledgements

Reflections on Cirrus fatal #61 near Buttonville Airport in Canada

Loss of Engine Power Factor

Mechanical Things Do Fail

Two Pilots at the Controls

Back to Loss of Engine Power during Takeoff Climb

Departure Briefing

Using CAPS during Takeoff Climb

Low Altitude Options for CAPS

Why Crash with a Usable Rocket and Parachute?

The Fatal Choice: Stall and Crash

Tales of CAPS Pulls -- Guidance for Cirrus Instructors

Noting the frequency of CAPS pulls and fatal Cirrus accidents

Partners in Command experience the Simtrain Simulator

Tales of CAPS Pulls -- The Decision

Bill Graham pulls while inverted after high-altitude loss of control

James Turpen pulls after recalling several Cirrus accidents

What did James learn about his decision?

BRS Founder Boris Popov on the Cirrus parachute system

Minimum deployment altitude

Drag/brake chute on the ground

Pull Early, Pull Often, and Keep Pulling!

Steering with power under canopy

When to pull the handle?

When you need it, use it!

CAPS criteria on departure -- the presentation

A Photo Story of Landing a Cirrus

Factors in Cirrus Landing Accidents

What the POH says about Normal Landings

What does the Flight Operations Manual say about Normal Landings

What do we mean by "landing speeds"?

What does it look like to land this way?

Your landing check ride

What can go wrong?

Proficiency in landing will reduce risk of accidents

On the distinctions of CAPS pulls, activations, deployments, fatalities and saves

2010 Q1 ends with improved Cirrus safety record

Tale of a scud runner -- Me!

The 5 P’s

The Plan (Actually Plural, Plans)

Plan A – Fly VFR under the bases

Plan B – No bases, then loiter to see if the weather changes

Plan C – No VFR conditions to continue, then return VFR to Las Vegas

Plan D – Worst case with no VFR conditions on the return

The Pilot

The Plane

The Passengers

The Programming

What Actually Happened

A stall caused by an
increase in load factor

Flight instructors are afraid
their students will stall