An Epistle on CAPS by Craig Albright

Prompted by the thought-provoking post by Craig Albright on when to pull the chute, let me amplify his analysis in this safety blog.

Mantra  of "Pull early, pull often!"

It bothers some people.  "Early" might be misconstrued as "immediately" without regard to other alternatives. "Often" might be misconstrued as "everytime" that there is a potential problem.

As often the case, the phrase contains many meanings.  Craig's post did an excellent job of getting to the importance of shifting conventional wisdom about the CAPS parachute.

Changing the Conventional Wisdom

I've sat on the sidelines (for a few years) while the "to pull or not to pull" debates have ebbed and flowed.  And, our "pull early, pull often" mantra has always bothered me slightly -- both as a pilot and an instructor.  Yet, changing the conventional wisdom of "fly it into the crash as far as possible" mindset is incredibly difficult, particularly when most students/pilots don't train in an aircraft with a 'chute.  As a result, they never build that particular "back door" into their thinking.  And, combine the training issue with marketing hyperbole from other manufacturers having vested interests in maintaining the current mindset and things get pretty muddy...

That's it!  Change the mindset.  Build the experience and expectation that a Cirrus pilot has CAPS as a last resort.

Increase the Probability that Cirrus Pilots will use CAPS

Contrary to existing conventional wisdom (outside of COPA) and opposing, marketing-based philosophy, we need to increase the probability that Cirrus pilots (or their front-seat passengers) will employ the BRS option when other actions would be ineffective.  In some cases, this could mean that pulling the 'chute is the very first action taken!  On the other hand, depending upon the circumstances, deploying the parachute could truly be a "last ditch" effort.

If you fly a Cirrus, then you are the one to take action. Prebrief on the ground in which scenarios you would activate CAPS. Practice the muscle memory of touching your head (to orient your hand) and reaching for the CAPS handle (to activate the parachute system). Brief your passengers. Maintain awareness of your altitude (to act before you don't have enough).  Use a Garmin reminder that you have a CAPS option.

When have you lost control?

Everyone probably agrees that pulling the chute is appropriate when the pilot has "lost control".  But, what's "lost control"?  Does that mean that the airplane is uncontrollable...by anyone?  Or, does it simply mean that the pilot-in-question cannot regain control?  Of course, the difference between the two is training.

Know yourself.  What are your skills?  What is your proficiency with those skills?

Recovery from Unusual Attitudes

Everyone - VFR and IFR pilots alike - has done "unusual attitudes under the hood"; it's a PTS requirement.  So, if someone gets discombobulated at night (or in IMC) do they employ their training and recover the plane (assuming they are capable at that moment in time) or are they "spring loaded" to pull the chute?  One can easily argue that they should take the course of action that has the higher probability of success.

Herein lies a conundrum.  If you trained and demonstrated recovery from unusual attitudes, then you have that experience and skill.  Have you trained and demonstrated activation of the CAPS system?  Really?  A Cirrus-specific simulator would be a place to gain that experience.  An investment of time and money that might save your life.

Does CAPS Justify Poor Judgment?

And, for many folks, that might mean using the chute.  Unfortunately, that logic can be used to justify ongoingly poor judgment, inadequate training and mediocre pilot performance.  Yet, I believe there are definitely times when pulling the chute under those circumstances IS the most appropriate course of action.  Of course, determining the "tilt point" is the challenge.

One response to this thought is to ask should the sentence for poor judgment in aviation be the death penalty.

Another response is to look at yourself and your own decisions.  Do you have the training?  Do you strive for improvement in your pilot performance?  Do you tolerate your own lapses in judgment?

Activating CAPS Requires Judgment

As pilots (and instructors), we try to create procedures and rules for a variety of reasons:  they reduce an infinity of possible courses of action to a manageable subset of acceptable possibilities; they take advantage of experience; they can be written down, communicated, and followed by people with different training and skill levels; they can be both general and specific, appropriate to the circumstances; and, when you're up to your ass in alligators, it's hard to remember...  So, checklist and procedures are good things to have available.  But, that's all they are -- rote procedures to be followed after the PIC has determined in his/her judgment that the procedure should be executed.  But, it seems to me that the prerequisite judgment isn't nearly as black/while...

And since CAPS is an option to be used as a last resort, you need to determine your chosen procedures promptly.  Keep a watch on airspeed and altitude – too much airspeed and CAPS may fail, too little altitude and CAPS may not deploy in time.

One Solution Does Not Fit All Situations

Everyone also probably agrees that pulling the chute is appropriate sometimes well in advance of actually losing control (i.e., engine failure).  But, now, we're in a gray area where skill and training become important factors.  And, even though we all fly similar aircraft, as pilots, our skill levels are often quite diverse.  Some folks practice stalls only with an instructor and haven't done a simulated engine failure (leading to a power-off landing) since...  Other pilots make nearly every landing a power-off event and can predict their ability to reach a particular landing site sans engine very accurately.  So, I would expect that pilots at those two training/skill extremes could easily choose completely different, and quite appropriate, solutions when faced with the same circumstances.  One solution certainly doesn't fit everyone.

Activating CAPS doesn't fit every situation either.   See the earlier blog entry CAPS may not be the best option!

It Still Comes Down to Our Own Judgment

As valuable as our Monday morning quarterbacking is with respect to accident review, sometimes we can get snagged by our own psychology.  For years, when I read Aviation Safety, I poured over the NTSB reports trying to determine what I'd do differently than the pilot-in-question.  Sometimes, it was the actions taken; sometimes it was the circumstances.  But, in most cases, I could make a concrete determination that usually bolstered my confidence.  I yearned for black/while rules and procedures that would keep me safe and avoid their tragic outcomes.  Unfortunately, that approach doesn't really address our biggest challenge:  judgment.  And, that's difficult to develop without actually being in circumstances that require the pilot to adapt and possibly abandon one course of action to execute another.  From my point-of-view, too often, our "after action analysis" lapses into defenses of our personal sets of rules/procedures that we have constructed to keep ourselves safe.  And, as we all know, wars are fought on the basis of belief.  It's little wonder that some of our threads head for melt-down...

The decision process on when to use CAPS covers a lot of possibilities.  There simply cannot be one answer for all situations.  Cirrus pilots who fly with CAPS may be challenged more than those without CAPS.  A Cirrus pilot must abandon recovery to activate CAPS.  Too many fatal Cirrus accidents have killed people who had the time, the altitude, the CAPS handle -- and yet there was no evidence that they tried.

Break the Accident Chain -- Sooner

So, where am I headed with this overly long monologue?  Basically, I think that until the technology can fly the airplane, it will always be superseded by pilot judgment and proper training.  COPA can have an impact upon the later two items.  That's the emphasis of our CPPPs.  That's why scenario-based training is evolving to replace the skills-only curriculum.  We all know about "accident chains".  In my view, using the chute is basically an immediate action to break the very last link in the chain.  Personally, I'd like to see all of us use judgment and training to save ourselves (and our passengers) much sooner...

So would the leadership of both COPA and Cirrus Design.

Acknowledging Craig

If you managed to read this entire epistle, thanks for your patience.  This has been building for awhile.

Craig